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Media, hegemony, and polarization in Latin America 
Jairo Lugo-Ocando and Sara García Santamaría 
The news media have always been considered an essential pillar of liberal democracy: the 
fourth estate. It is not a coincidence that this fourth estate underpinned the transition from 
authoritarian rule to liberal democracy that took place in Latin America and central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) during the 1980s and 1990s.1 In both transitional processes, the 
emerging political forces saw an opportunity in the media to connect with a volatile and 
depoliticized citizenry, replacing the old discredited pillars of society (whether unions, the 
military, or the church) and progressively building a new hegemony. However, the influence 
of the media in guiding and strengthening these transitional democracies still remains unclear 
today. Currently, the idea of an inherently democratizing media holds little weight, as young 
democratic institutions are often too weak and volatile.2,3,4 Inadequate regulation, 
polarization, and the lack of an independent journalistic culture can render media outlets 
captive to both political and market influences and, therefore, unable to fulfil their 
democratizing potential. 
Over the last few years, a wave of left-wing governments in Latin America has brought 
WKHPHGLD¶Vdemocratizing role into public debate, giving visibility to long-standing popular 
demands. For the most part, this new Latin American Left has focused its discourses and 
SROLFLHVRQWKHUHJLRQ¶VHOLWLVWPHGLDV\VWHPV)RULQVWDQFHJRYHUQPHQWVLQ9HQH]XHOD
Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia have profoundly reformed media regulation in a process 
aimed normatively at democratizing media ownership. In some cases, this has translated 
effectively in the redistribution of, for example, broadcasting licences, which have been taken 
away from private corporations and given to the state, civil society organizations, and private 
individuals who have openly supported the current governments. 
Nevertheless, the trend in Latin America, as in nascent central and Eastern European 
democracies, has been overall a coexistence of formal rules and informal practices. In the 
case of Latin America this means a situation in which old media systems have not been 
completely removed from the equation or still play a significant role in defining and shaping 
public opinion in those countries. Moreover, while these governments publically present 
media reforms as flawlessly democratic, the application of these allegedly democratizing 
policies is endangered in practice by the persistence of old journalistic cultures, corporate 
interests, and poor governance. 
The reality on the ground is that media reforms in Latin America and central and Eastern 
Europe are taking place in highly polarized climates, with the executive branch seeking to 
increase its communicational hegemony at the expense of public scrutiny. In this context, the 
liberal ideals of media pluralism and independence are in jeopardy. For instance, attacks on 
freedom of speech have become commonplace either through the discretionary hand-outs of 
state advertising and licences, or the debatable criminalization of libel. Furthermore, certain 
/DWLQ$PHULFDQH[HFXWLYHVKDYHGHVLJQHGZKDWVHHPVWREHDQµDQWL-SUHVVSOD\ERRN¶DLPHG
at strengthening their communicational hegemony, threatening journalists with lawsuits, and 
closing critical news organizations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between media and democracy 
through the efforts that many Latin American left-wing governments have undertaken over 
the last decade, often finding a mismatch between discourse and practice. In the following 
paragraphs, we argue that polarization has become an essential trait in the relationship 
between left-wing governments and the media in Latin America. Furthermore, we suggest 
that this polarization corresponds to a populist conceptualization of liberal democratic 
institutions, such as the news media, which are seen as dominated by the ruling elite and, 
therefore, antagonistic to socially just, people-centred agendas. In our view, these actions and 
approaches have offered an opportunity to scrutinize the traditionally elitist and partisan 
structures of the media in Latin America. 
The question that arises is whether left-wing governments in Latin America are creating a 
favourable environment for the democratization of media systems or, as some suspect, simply 
institutionalizing political control, recycling old clientelar networks, and scrapping pluralism 
from the agenda. Looking at the Latin American case, it seems that the news media can only 
become a democratizing force so long as political institutions become transparent along the 
way, thereby guaranteeing media independence.5 Finally, we believe that current debates in 
Latin America offer important lessons on the relationship between media and politics in the 
still young central and Eastern European democracies, exposing the gap between 
democratizing policies and discourses, on the one hand, and informal practices, on the other. 
Historical Context 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War sparked a transitional period 
towards liberal democracy in central and Eastern Europe. These external historical events had 
also an exponential impact in young Latin American democracies, setting a favourable stage 
for empowerment and relative emancipation from US oversight. However, the transition that 
started in the late twentieth century was not an easy path for most Latin American countries. 
In 1982, the region experienced a deep recession and debt crises that lasted until the end of 
the twentieth century, characterized by the fall of international prices of raw materials and 
commodities, upon which their economies depended and still depend. Most governments 
decided to fight the crises by embracing the implementation of austerity measures and market 
liberalization policies, inspired by the so-called Washington Consensus.6 In this unpredictable 
context, not only political parties, but democracy itself, faced a growing climate of popular 
cynicism and growing anti-political sentiment.7 &RQVHTXHQWO\SHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVUHJDUGLQJ
the ability of traditional political institutions to foster good governance and public debate 
were severely eroded. 
7KHHURVLRQRIµSROLWLFVDVXVXDO¶EURXJKWWKHZKROHSDUW\V\VWHPWRWKHEULQNRIGLVDUUD\
damaging democratic institutions and leaving a power vacuum. This gap, though, did not last 
long, as it was rapidly filled by de facto powers, such as private corporations, the military, or 
the mass media. 8,9 In this context, the traditional media outlets became a leading political 
force, assuming the role of political opposition.10 The problem that arose in this context was 
that media outlets found themselves leading the transitional change with obsolete tools 
(media structure, values and practices), which endangered the media independence in the 
democratizing process. 
In the midst of change, most Latin American media outlets carried the burden of a long-
standing subjugation to national and international corporations, with extensive interests in key 
industries such as banking, mining, or agriculture. Therefore, the traditional media outlets, 
which in the past had even backed military juntas and repression, were immersed in a 
µV\PELRWLF-GHSHQGHQFH¶ZLWKFRQVHUYDWLYHSROLWLFVDQGWKHSULYDWHVHFWRURYHUDOOVXSSRUWLQJ
Comment [PD1]: Please check specific 
page reference against range listed in note 
and amend as necessary. 
Comment [SG2]: We changed the 
second reference (see number 9) 
elite interests. This elite-run news agenda still persists in all its forms, as seen during the 2002 
FRXSDWWHPSWLQ9HQH]XHODZKHQWKHPDLQVWUHDPPHGLDEULHIO\VXSSRUWHG3HGUR&DUPRQD¶V
forty-eight-hour de facto government. 
The Fight over Media Hegemony 
The turn of the century brought a series of political changes and debates that would 
eventually alter the traditional media allegiances. The election of Hugo Chávez as 
9HQH]XHOD¶VSUHVLGHQWFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQPDQ\ZD\VDVDVRUWRIFDWKDUVLVWKDWUHOHDVHGWKH
popular accumulated frustration and resentment towards old political and economic elites. 
The fact is that, by the beginning of the new millennium, several Latin American countries 
had elected left-wing presidents who promoted social reforms and wealth redistribution 
agendas. While the ascension of these radical agendas has redefined the range of political 
possibilities in Latin America, it has been unable to do so in a climate of consensus and 
debate. On the contrary, the fight for hegemony between old and new elites has taken place in 
an increasingly hostile environment, leading to widespread ideological, class-based, and 
ethnic polarization,11,12 which has been especially tangible in places such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.13 
In the midst of these sweeping changes, the mainstream media found themselves ever 
closer to the long-standing elites, leading to recurrent attacks on the new Left, and the defence 
of conservative politics. The brief overthrow of Chávez in Venezuela in 2002, mentioned 
above, has become a symbol of media opposition to democratically elected governments in 
Latin America, promoting what Eleazar Díaz Rangel14 KDVGHVFULEHGDVµmediated coups¶ 
,QIDFWDVVRPHKDYHVXJJHVWHGµthe private mainstream media still owes the Venezuelan 
society a good explanation about their reprehensible behaviour during those yearV¶15 This 
µmedia war¶LQLWLDWHGLQ9HQH]XHODRSHQHGWKHFRQIURQWDWLRQEHWZHHQOHIW-wing governments 
and private media outlets, now seen as major political players able to galvanize the opposition 
against the government and as a target for reform for those trying to build a new hegemonic 
order. 
7KHQHZ/DWLQ$PHULFD¶V/HIW¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKHPHGLDFDQEHVHHQDVVWHPPLQJ
from a populist conceptualization of politics and, therefore, of media policy.16,17,18 In this 
context, the news media are seen from a dualistic perspective, friendly when advancing the 
H[HFXWLYH¶VJRDOVDQGKRVWLOHZKHQREVWUXFWLQJWKHP7KH/DWLQ$PHULFDQFRQWH[WKDVEHHQ
characterized by fierce hostility towards the mainstream private media, and an idealization of 
public and collectively owned media outlets. This antagonistic view of the media manifests 
itself as a discourse (through recurrent verbal, legal, and physical attacks on media outlets and 
journalists by those in power) and as a political strategy (through broadening the scope of 
state-owned media, supervising private media content and ownership, and promoting a 
restrictive regulation of freedom of speech). 
Overall, the consolidation of power by left-wing populist leaders in Latin America 
marked the beginning of a profound transformation in the relationship between the news 
media, the market, and the government. Marcelino Bisbal suggests that Latin American 
populist-leftist leaderVKDYHVHDUFKHGIRUDQHZKHJHPRQ\WKURXJKµjuridical control, political 
control, governmental control and constitutional control¶RYHUGHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQV
including the news media.19 In fact, the new scenario has seen left-wing leaders and their 
VXSSRUWHUVILJKWLQJIRUDJUHDWHUVKDUHRIWKHPHGLDVSDFHFUHDWLQJDµmedia bypass¶EHWZHHQ
the executive and citizens that dismisses any critical voices.20 This aspiration for the 
hegemonic control of information and communication flows has been the acknowledged goal 
of many media reforms in the region. For instance, Andrés Izarra, former minister of 
Communications and Information under CháYH]¶VJRYHUQPHQWDQGFXUUHQWO\'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO
of TelesurGHFODUHGWKDWWKH9HQH]XHODQVWDWHZDVSURPRWLQJµstate-led communicational and 
informative hegemony aimed at winning the ideological battle¶DJDLQVWROGHOLWHV.21 It is this 
context in which many Latin American countries are currently undergoing an information 
battle, in which media hegemony has become essential to sustaining public support.22 In any 
case, in the midst of populist confrontation and polarization, coming both from the executives 
and from oppositional parties, the democratizing potential of the media is being 
compromised. 
The Polarization of Media Debates 
At the centre of this battle for hegemony lies the predominant populist character of the new 
left-wing governments. Therefore it is worth taking into account the consequences of 
sustained populist media discourses and practices. Benjamin Arditi23 considers that populism 
can serve both democratic and undemocratic goals and, therefore, can endanger democratic 
debates in its extreme variant. For instance, when populist leaders frame their relationship 
ZLWKWKHSULYDWHPHGLDDVDµPHGLDZDU¶IRUFRPPXQLFDWLRQDOKHJHPRQ\DWWHPSWWR
monopolies all channels of communication, and silence other channels of mediation, they are 
compromising democratic debates. This was the case under Juan Domingo Perón (1895±
1974) in Argentina and of the Fascist regimes in Europe between the 1930s and 1940s. 
This is also what, more or less, has occurred throughout Latin America recently. While 
not being inherently undemocratic, the discretional use of media regulation by populist 
governments has had a negative impact in the region. In fact, populist governments have 
often transferred their political responsibilities to oppositional parties while contributing to 
political polarization by articulating an µXV¶YHUVXVµWKHP¶ logic, in which any criticism is 
labelled as conspiracy and treason. Therefore, a populist view of the media limits the scope of 
what can and cannot be reported, as it forces journalists from both sides of the political 
spectrum to embrace extreme positions. Consequently, moderate voices, alternative views, 
and calls for consensus are all but excluded from media debates thereby undermining 
pluralism. 
In a context of extreme polarization, the elements that by nature would contribute to a 
healthy political debate are partitioned into opposing mirrors, reflecting almost 
unrecognizable caricatures of reality. This dichotomy is expressed in a deeply confrontational 
environment, where both sides try fervently to establish their own hegemonic interests. 
Therefore, the media landscape in Latin America is now deeply divided between official 
PHGLDXVHGDVDQH[WHQVLRQRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURSDJDQGDPDFKLQHDQGFRUSRUDWHPHGLD
(owned by the privileged classes and aimed at preserving traditional privileges by opposing 
redistributive policies). This landscape favours radicals from both sides of the spectrum, 
which have become too complacent with their propped up media, which they can use in their 
own benefit. Summarizing, this polarized climate harbours self-censorship, oppresses 
oppositional voices, and virulently undermines the democratizing role that journalism is 
expected to play in liberal democracies. 
In great part Latin American new democracies, pro-government and anti-government 
media saturate their narratives with exaggerated versions of their own realities, fostering an 
environment of confrontational politics in which opposing ends of society refuse to negotiate 
or even recognize their counterparts. Regrettably, one must conclude that the utopian creation 
of an impartial and independent media which promotes public debate and pluralism, has 
never been a priority for populist governments in the region. Instead, these governments have 
prioritized national and communal rights (such as widespread access and mixed ownership) 
over individual ones, discarded as simple bourgeois privileges.24,25 The problem is that 
national and communal rights are unilaterally decided by the executive branch of the 
government, which ends up monopolizing policymaking, licences, advertising, and access. 
First Casualty of War 
The exclusionary and confrontational rhetoric of friends and foes, which lies at the core of 
populism, necessarily intensifies the polarization of political debates.26 In these bellicose 
environments, journalistic professionalism and independence are often the first casualties. 
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa has been known for his discursive hostility, developing a 
ZLGHUDQJHRIGLVTXDOLILFDWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHSULYDWHO\RZQHGPHGLD,Q&RUUHD¶VGLVFRXUVH
oppositional media represents oligarchic interests and disrupt, rather than fosters democratic 
debates. Indeed, Correa has repeatedly accused critical media and journalists of terrorism, 
IDVFLVPDQGIXQGDPHQWDOLVPFDOOLQJWKHPµIDWKHUODQGPHUFKDQWV¶µFKHHUOHDGHUVRI
QHROLEHUDOLVP¶RUµLQIRUPDWLYHPDILD¶. As Correa put it himself in his inauguration ceremony: 
µLIWKHSUHVVGHIDPHVPLVLQIRUPVVODQGHUVRXUJRYHUQPHQWVLWLVIUHHGRPRIVSHHFK,ID
president replies to them, it is an attack on freedom of speech. Some have more freedom than 
others¶ (24 May 2013).27,28 
In many cases, left-wing governments have used legitimate causes to lobby for media 
laws that limit, or could potentially undermine, freedom of speech. For instance, in 2012 the 
Nicaraguan Supreme Court passed a polemical law that criminalized all violence against 
ZRPHQLQFOXGLQJµmedia violence¶$VDUHVXOWVDWLUHDQGFULWLFLVPRIIHPDOHSROLWLFLDQV
including the First Lady, could be interpreted as a criminal offence and, as journalists and 
opposition parties have warned, promote self-censorVKLS6LPLODUO\%ROLYLD¶VUHFHQWLaw 
against Racism and all forms of Discrimination counts on widespread popular support, as it 
fights against racist hate speech that has characterized the mainstream media. According to 
%ROLYLD¶V3UHVLGHQW(YR0RUDOHVWKHJRDORIWKHODZLVWRUHJXODWHWKHµexcessive freedom of 
speech¶LQWKHSUHVVZKLFKKDVUHSHDWHGO\SXEOLVKHGUDFLDODWWDFNVDJDLQVWLQGLJHQRXVSHRSOH
including himself.29 However, critics such as the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic 
Church (CEB) have warned that the law could endanger freedom of expression altogether, as 
it grants the government discretionary powers to close, suspend, and fine any media outlets 
VSUHDGLQJDOOHJHGO\µUDFLVW¶RUµGLVFULPLQDWRU\¶LGHDV30 
In this context of media legislative reform, Hugo CháYH]¶V9HQH]XHODKDVEHHQDFOHDU
reference point in the populist restructuring of media systems in Latin America. However, 
such restructuring has not been without contradiction. Although the 1999 Venezuelan 
Constitution addressed freedom of speech as a human right, this did not prevent the 
government from increasing its discretionary powers over the media three years later, after 
the so-FDOOHGµmedia coup¶7KHUHVXOWZDVWKHDSSURYDORIWKHLaw on Social Responsibility in 
Radio and Television (known by the public as Ley Resorte) in 2004, which was extended to 
electronic media in 2010. 
:KHUHDVWKHODZGHGLFDWHGDWLWOHWRµGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQDQGFLWL]HQSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶DQRWKHU
segment forbade the dissemination of a series of vaguely worded offences, such as messages 
IRPHQWLQJFLWL]HQV¶DQ[LHW\DQGGLVUHJDUGLQJGHPRFUDWLFDXWKRULWLHV. The Resorte law has 
been key in dissuading criticism by broadcasters, as it imposes substantial sanctions, from 
heavy fines to revocation of licenses, which have been applied to over 200 radio and 
television stations around the country. For some, the implementation of restrictive legislation 
LVSDUWRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHPHGLWDWHGVWUDWHJ\WRUHSODFHWKHKHJHPRQ\RISULYDWH
broadcasters with the hegemony of state-owned and state-friendly media. 
More Laws, Less Freedom 
The steps taken by the Venezuelan government have been quickly followed by other regional 
governments, including those in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras, where the use of 
legislative powers to undermine the critical role of the media is now a widespread practice. 
For instance, the 2014 Ecuadorean media law has been officially presented as a necessary 
step to democratize the role of the media. As in other neighbouring countries, it redistributes 
PHGLDEURDGFDVWLQJOLFHQVHV+RZHYHUFULWLFVKDYHGHILQHGLWDVDµgagging law¶ley 
mordaza), as it gives responsibility over media monitoring to government-appointed 
regulatory bodies, compromising the fairness of the process. 
Likewise, the new Ecuadorian law punishes with prison time the publication of non-
verified and non-contrasted information, an ironic measure that criminalizes whistleblowing 
LQWKHVDPHFRXQWU\WKDWIDPRXVO\JDYHDV\OXPWR-XOLDQ$VVDQJH:LNL/HDNV¶IRXQGHUDQG
editor-in-chief. Finally, the independence of the media in that country has also been eroded 
through the harassment of media workers. For instance, a study from the NGO Fundamedios 
denounced more than eighteen government lawsuits against Ecuadorian media editors and 
journalists between 2007 and 2011, which could potentially pose liabilities worth millions of 
US dollars and lead to the bankruptcy of many of the mainstream media outlets in the 
country. 
The examples above suggest that, in the face of tangible, or imagined, threats to their 
authority and hegemony (such as coup attempts, separatist movements, and social unrest), the 
new Left in Latin America has opted for populist discourses that claim media 
democratization, while in practice increasing their own media hegemony. 
Conclusion 
The media in Latin America and CEE have undergone a period of transformation over the 
past few decades. As we have seen, the recent wave of left-wing Latin American governments 
has put the role of the media on the public agenda, trying to correct past imbalances (such as 
ownership concentration, elitism, and politicization) through media reform. There is no doubt 
that many of these reforms were necessary and have been a first step for democratizing media 
systems, allowing them to go hand in hand with other institutions in the search for good 
governance. 
The main contribution of the new Latin American Left has been precisely that, opening 
debates on the role that the media should play in democratic societies. For instance, the recent 
Uruguayan media law approved by José 0XMLFD¶VH[HFXWLYHVXJJHVWVWKDWOHIW-wing 
JRYHUQPHQWVFDQHIILFLHQWO\UHIRUPPHGLDV\VWHPVµproviding a legal and regulatory 
environment that allows the media to be an effective watchdog¶31 and a democratizing force 
in the region.32 In the midst of these confrontations, a new consciousness is arising among 
some news organizations, which are steadily distancing themselves from partisan interests 
and adopting an active watchdog role: scrutinizing the political elites, promoting anti-
corruption campaigns, and investigating human rights abuses.33,34 In some countries, like 
Brazil, they have even publicly revisited their political past.35,36 These are the real and present 
hopes for the democratization of media structures in Latin America. 
Despite these glimpses of hope, there seems to prevail, however, a gap between theory 
and practice. Opposition parties, journalist associations and international non-profit 
organizations LQ/DWLQ$PHULFDVWLOOREVHUYHZLWKFDXWLRQWKHµGHPRFUDWL]LQJ¶changes 
claimed by left-wing populist leaders. According to these sceptical views, media reforms 
have not promoted a clear pluralisation of media spaces, but have only shifted the hegemonic 
control of media spaces from private to state-controlled hands. The new Left, they argue, has 
merely recycled the elitist and clientele-media model they themselves criticize, selectively 
favouring friendly media outlets while attacking critical ones.37 They point to lawsuits against 
journalists, the discretionary allocation of public advertisement and licenses, the 
criminalization of libel, and the governmental supervision of the media as some examples. 
Furthermore, they highlight that the most explicit threats are currently coming from state-led 
attempts to gain hegemonic control over media communications, something that has been 
fiercely resisted by the private media so far (with mixed degrees of success). 
The point is that Latin American populist leaders have embraced polarization both as a 
discourse and as a political communication strateJ\RIWHQFRXQWLQJRQWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQFLHV¶
unconditional support.38 In our view, the problem is the struggle for communicational 
hegemony in itself, as it inevitably leads to the Manichaean polarization of media spaces 
EHWZHHQµXV¶DQGµWKHP¶marginalizing QRWRQO\WKHµRWKHU¶EXWDOODOWHUQDWLYHFRQVHQVXDO
voices. We also believe that this populist division of society in two irreconcilable blocks has 
serious consequences for democratic deliberative debate, ideological pluralism, dialogue, and 
collaboration, thereby hindering the development of that strong public sphere that the region 
so desperately needs. 
The combination of polarizing and populist views of the media in Latin American and 
ECC transitional democracies, such as Hungary,39 has become an effective strategy for old 
and new elites to hold audiences captive to their own interests, while claiming to represent the 
popular will. As long as both sides of the political spectrum continue to address only those in 
their own camp, Latin American populist leaders will continue to uphold the region¶s long 
tradition of low journalistic and democratic standards. This is the real and present danger of 
establishing hegemony by means of media polarization; a harsh lesson from which central 
and Eastern European societies should learn if they wish to consolidate robust democracies in 
the near future. 
  
Abstract 
The news media have always been considered an essential pillar of liberal democracy. 
However, the democratizing potential of the media in transitional societies still remains 
unclear. In Latin America, democratization processes have long coexisted with oligarchic 
media systems. Over the last few years, a wave of left-wing governments has brought the 
democratizing role of the media into public debate, giving visibility to long-standing popular 
demands. While these governments have hailed new media laws as the panacea for 
democratizing the media, the trend has translated into the coexistence of formal rules and 
informal practices. In this chapter, we argue that the failure of current media policies is due to 
a mixture of populist politics, polarizing discourses, and a weak rule of law. 
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